INTRODUCTION
Sometimes dramatic, sometimes mundane, acts of civil disobedience bring attention to issues that have recently included climate change, policing, and high school closings. 1 In the United States, we are surrounded by protest. The stories of these protests capture deep aspects of the human experience and our relationship to government power. 2 These stories often involve a confrontation between the protester and the law. Popular media is full of stories of protesters who have stepped over the law: the news article regarding a nun who served seven years in federal prison for pouring a vial of human blood on a Trident missile silo; 4 the business journal report on the $20 million cost to the city of Baltimore for the police overtime and cleanup as a result of protests. 5 The stories of protest weave a complex picture of its place in a society built on the rule of law. Usually without express acknowledgment, popular references highlight a fundamental democratic tension underlying each act of civil disobedience. Often, our cultural references embody recognition of the right to assemble, speak, and protest, and an acknowledgement of the protesters' underlying grievances. This sense of the -right‖ of protest competes with the similarly recognized importance of the primacy of the law and obedience to it. These different strands of public discourse epitomize this tension. On the one hand, popular sentiment is expressed through the sense that obedience to an unjust law is no virtue. 6 In this view, speech and dissent are fundamental principles, and protest is an embodiment of these values. On the other hand, some discourse emphasizes the economic costs of protest-the cost of police, the loss of business-while legal scholars and jurists tend to emphasize the social and legal disruption caused by protest. 6. -One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.‖ Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Apr. 16, 1963. -An unjust law is itself a species of violence. Arrest for its breach is more so. Now the law of nonviolence says that violence should be resisted not by counter-violence but by nonviolence . . . . This I do, by breaking the law and by peacefully submitting to arrest and imprisonment.‖ Mohandas Gandhi, NON-VIOLENCE IN PEACE AND WAR 1942 -49 (1962 . -Protest beyond the law is not a departure from democracy; it is absolutely essential to it.‖ HOWARD ZINN, THE ZINN READER: WRITINGS ON DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 383 (1997) 7. See, e.g., Charges Filed Against MOA Protesters, KARE 11 (Jan. 14, 2015, 11:22 PM), http://www.kare11.com/story/news/crime/2015/01/14/charges-filed-against-moa-prote sters-black-lives-matter/21752595/ (reporting that, in a case involving a protest at the Mall of America, the Deputy Chief of Police noted for the news station that -the protest has resulted in police overtime costs that now exceed $25,000 to taxpayers‖ and that the mall -has incurred more than $8,000 in security costs‖).
When a protest, even a non-violent protest, results in violation of a criminal prohibition, it exacerbates the strain. The competition between acquiescence to the law and opposition to the law creates, in trials of criminally disobedient protesters, a deep tension of values. Prosecutors and courts may expressly acknowledge the costs not only of the individual act of protest, but of protest and disobedience in general and the risks it poses to the legal and political systems. In the midst of this, questions arise regarding the extent protesters should be held criminally liable and punished for their actions. Among these questions are: whether protesters should be criminally liable? Does a protester's sense of the correctness of their action translate to a lack of remorse and thus justify a harsher sentence than that of a remorseful non-protester defendant? Should a protester's motivation to act in what they believed to be the public interest mitigate their culpability?
The tensions between protest and obedience are not easily resolved. How one evaluates the actions of a civilly disobedient protester will likely depend not only on how one evaluates the individual act but also upon how one views protest, the right of protest, the individual protester's motivations, and the overall costs of the protest action. Ultimately, the culpability of a protester may depend not only on the individual's actions, but also on the value the prosecutor, judge, or jury ascribes to protest and competing interests. 8 The determination of the justice or injustice of a protester's action thus requires inquiry into, and a balancing of, many factors. Important in the weighing might be individual and group disruption caused, the rationale for the protest, and the economic, legal, and political costs of the action. Inevitably, this balancing of values is individual to each action and each pro- tester. The specificity of these individual determinations of culpability can result in widely disparate determinations as to the culpability of a civilly disobedient protester. Some protesters are lauded, while others are vilified. Some protesters' charges are dismissed, while others face sentences more lengthy than their non-protester counterparts. 9 These disparate outcomes reflect a deep complexity underlying an evaluation as to the culpability of a civilly disobedient protester. The social motivation underlying even a criminal act of protest as well as the competing societal interests at play in a protester's trial make determinations of culpability more complex than in ordinary criminal trials. 10 Despite the fact that civilly disobedient protesters are distinct from non-protester criminal defendants, the current criminal system makes no room for distinction.
11 Given the challenges inherent in weighing the competing societal interests and the lack of analogy to a traditional criminal case, this article looks to other contexts to create a meaningful framework in which to balance these competing interests.
The competing interests that underlie a criminal prosecution of a civilly disobedient protester, while distinct in obvious and important ways from a traditional criminal prosecution, can be analogized to the complex balancing of values in a death penalty Rev. 201, 206 (1996) .
11. Under current criminal jurisprudence, there may be very little recognition of the distinctions between a civilly disobedient protesters and a non-protester criminal defendant. An attempt by the protester to introduce evidence of his distinct motivation is likely to be turned away as not relevant. See Martin L. Loesch, Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience Justification, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1064, 1100-02 (1991) (concluding that criminal law generally rejects motive testimony in civil disobedience cases).
case.
12 Death penalty proceedings acknowledge the social desire for retribution, and yet the significant procedural limitations required in a capital proceeding recognize equally weighty concerns as to fairness, equity, finality, and individuation. 13 In a capital case, the balancing of these interests is accomplished by individualized determinations in which the jury balances factors and makes a judgment as to community condemnation. This requirement of an individual determination-though existing in tension with other goals, including consistency across sentences and the avoidance of arbitrary sentences-is essential and necessary to impose a sentence of death.
14 One obvious difficulty with drawing analogies from capital cases is that death penalty jurisprudence has held itself apart with the concept that -death is different,‖ and the proceedings underlying these cases are distinct from non-capital proceedings.
15 Among 12. Though I analogize aspects of protester trials with capital proceedings, I do not intend in any way to diminish the severity of a proceeding in which the government seeks authorization to take a human life. In the words of the incomparable Anthony Amsterdam,
The decisions that lawyers make and mediate in capital prosecutions come as close to exercising God's own powers as humanity can come. Not only is the judgment to take life irreversible; it is literally incomprehensible. Whatever else we humans know, life and death are mysteries beyond our understanding; and when we decree that a person's life is forfeited, however solemnly, however righteously, we commit an act whose nature and whose consequences we cannot pretend to grasp. 14. The decision to impose the death penalty cannot be prescribed by law or imposed by a judge; it must be imposed by a jury. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (holding that the decision as to the existence of aggravating factors, which makes a defendant eligible for a death sentence, must be made by a jury); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (finding that, despite concerns about inconsistent application of the death penalty, a capital scheme that limits discretion by imposing categorical death sentences is impermissible); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S., 782, 801 (1982) (stating that when imposing the death penalty, an offender's -punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt‖); Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 290 (1991) (-[A]ll mandatory schemes by their nature circumscribe the range of moral considerations that are taken into account in an individual case to those which happen to be reflected in the substantive criminal law's doctrinal provisions.‖).
15. The other, and more obvious, difference is that an execution is a uniquely severe punishment. As a former capital defender, I in no way intend to minimize the importance of proceedings in which the government seeks legal justification to kill.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:737 the rationales underlying death's difference are concepts that the severity of the sentence and the finality inherent in its imposition are unique. While certainly valid distinctions, these rationales do not tell the whole story as to why death penalty jurisprudence is held out as distinct. A distinction cited frequently by the Supreme Court is that the moral complexity of balancing the complex issues requires a community determination as to societal norms. 16 While certainly different in terms of severity, the complex balancing required in death penalty proceedings can inform the weighing of values in protester trials. In both proceedings the determination is complex and morally based, and the need for a community conscience is particularly appropriate.
Death penalty jurisprudence, once an island unto itself, is evolving and its reach expanding. Since 2010, two broad jurisprudential trends, one in interpretations of the Eighth Amendment and the other in the Sixth Amendment jury trial arena, have eroded the partition between capital and non-capital offenses. The significance of these jurisprudential shifts can hardly be overstated, and their implications are just beginning to be felt. One unassailable conclusion is that, while the distinction between a sentence of death and imprisonment is unmistakable, the jurisprudential line between capital jurisprudence and non-capital criminal jurisprudence is eroding.
While the jurisprudential shifts in death penalty law resonate in a number of legal contexts, they provide particularly significant insight in trials of protesters. Acts of civil disobedience, though criminal, are in fact unlike ordinary criminal acts, and, as in the capital arena, significant competing values underlie the criminal prosecution of acts of civil disobedience. To courts and juries facing the challenge of navigating the complex, competing interests involved, death penalty jurisprudence can provide some guidance. As trials of protesters implicate important competing 16. Juries -reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a whole‖ and are thus -more likely to ‗express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.'‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (quoting Withurspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)); see also Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 60 (1980) (stating that retribution is an expression of the will of the community); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 155-56 (2004) (noting that the right to jury trial -has nothing to do with ‗the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency'‖ of a jury, but that a jury trial is more -free‖ in that it allows a community check on government power). community values, determinations as to community condemnation are appropriate. Capital jurisprudence provides an illustration of how individualized determinations of moral blameworthiness can ensure community participation in balancing the complex, competing values underlying the prosecution of criminally disobedient protesters.
Part I of this article discusses the rationales underlying concepts of death as different and the procedural requirementsincluding input by the jury-necessitated by the deeply moral nature of an execution determination. Part II of the article discusses two independent jurisprudential shifts that expand jurisprudential requirements previously confined to the death penalty arena. The final section, Part III, discusses the legal and moral underpinnings of civilly disobedient protest, the important community role in evaluating the culpability of civilly disobedient protesters, and the implications of recognizing civilly disobedient protest as different. The article concludes that evolving concepts in death penalty jurisprudence provide helpful analytical constructs for determining culpability in trials of civilly disobedient protesters. 17 Invalidating Georgia's death penalty scheme, Furman ushered in a de facto moratorium on capital punishment in the United States.
18 Four years after Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia, a plurality of the Court reiterated the rhetoric of difference while upholding the constitutionality of Georgia's 17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding -that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty‖ would have amounted to -cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments‖).
18. Though Furman's impact was significant, the Justices' opinions were fractured, and the case did not produce a majority opinion. Despite the divergence, two concurring Justices articulated the concept that death is different. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence noted that the death penalty -is a unique punishment‖ and -in a class by itself.‖ Id. at 286, 289 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart articulated the oft-cited opinion that -[t]he penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.‖ Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The jurisprudential result of acknowledging death as different from other sanctions is the recognition that capital proceedings can be imposed only if the procedures employed are sufficient to guide the decision maker through the complex values at play. 22 A set of procedural systems has arisen in order to implement these heightened protections, designed to ensure both that a defendant is -actually guilty‖ of the offense and that a death sentence is the -appropriate‖ punishment. The first step in a capital sentencing proceeding is a narrowing of the scope of those offenders sentenced to death. This first step attempts to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for only -the worst of the worst,‖ 24 by distinguishing death-eligible offenses from others for which a death sentence is not appropriate. 25 In this initial filtering, an individual becomes eligible for a sentence of death only upon the finding of one or more aggravating circumstances. 26 The potential aggravators that render an individual eligible for execution are limited and must be delineated by statute. 27 Only upon a finding of one or more of the statutory aggravating factors does an individual become eligible for imposition of a death sentence.
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If an individual is found eligible for a death sentence pursuant to step one, capital sentencing jurisprudence requires an inquiry to determine the existence of factors mitigating implementation of the death penalty. Under step two, mitigating circumstances nan, J., dissenting) (-It is an outright abdication of our responsibility to minimize the risk that innocent people are put to death.‖), cannot be limited or defined in contrast to the way aggravating factors must be limited and defined at step one. Instead, under step two, the sentencer must be permitted to consider -any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.‖ 29 In this second step, once mitigating circumstances are presented, the proceedings require a balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and a determination of the moral propriety of a sentence of death. 30 The moral determinations that underlie capital proceedings are the subject of the next section.
B. Moral Determinations in Capital Proceedings
Though legal scholars point to the moral underpinnings of all criminal verdicts, and even of law in general, judicial rhetoric often omits mention of the underlying morality of legal determinations. 31 One of the distinctions of capital jurisprudence is that 32 This judgment as to the -moral guilt‖ of the defendant is the final-and essential-part of every capital sentencing proceeding. 33 The moral foundation of these determinations in a capital case arises from the complex balancing of factors required to determine whether the culpability of an individual is so great as to establish that the person has -lost his moral entitlement to live.‖ 34 Justice O'Connor has stated that -the individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty is a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant‖ 35 and indicated that imposition of a death sentence should represent a -reasoned moral response‖ to the offender and the offense. 34. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued that, at a minimum, the death penalty must be reserved for -offences which in the highest degree shock the public feeling-to murders accompanied with circumstances of aggravation. Determination of entitlement to life must be made individually in each case. 39 The imposition of a death sentence should represent a -reasoned moral response‖ specific to the offender and the offense. 40 Because balancing culpability is individual, a death sentence cannot be mandated by law and its imposition must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 41 Among the most important of the procedures ensuring an individualized determination is that an individual is qualified to sit as a juror on a death penalty sentencing only if the juror has the ability to be swayed both in favor of mitigation or aggravation. 42 Not only can this individual moral weighting not be removed from the jury's shoulders, but the burden cannot even be eased; it is impermissible for a party or the court to lighten or reduce the jury's ultimate responsibility with regard to the determination of whether to impose a death sentence. 43 The mandate of individuation, though one of the cornerstones of capital jurisprudence, exists in tension alongside significant concerns about consistent application of death sentences.
44 Arbi- 40. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added). 41. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional Louisiana's sentencing statute in mandating a death sentence upon conviction of certain offenses); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (-There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable . . . .‖).
42. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 736 (1992) (holding impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment and a line of capital jurisprudence that a defendant be sentenced by a juror who has indicated an unwillingness to be swayed by mitigation evidence); see also id. at 751-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (-[O]bscured within the fog of confusion that is our . . . ‗death is different' jurisprudence, the Court strikes a further blow against the People in its campaign against the death penalty. Not only must mercy be allowed, but now only the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment.‖).
43. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-31. 44. Justice Stewart in his Furman concurrence expressed concern about arbitrary imposition of the punishment, invoking oft-cited concerns that the punishment was imposed so -wantonly,‖ -freakishly,‖ and -capriciously‖ that it was as if the unfortunate defendant trariness was a central concern to members of the majority in the Court's 1972 Furman decision. 45 In assessing the arbitrariness that infected Georgia's system for the imposition of death sentences, significant responsibility seemed to lie on the state's lack of procedures to guide sentencing discretion. 46 Capital jurisprudence since Furman has, to a large extent, been defined by the struggle to balance the mandate of individual determinations with the need to avoid -wanton and arbitrary‖ imposition of death sentences. 47 In the ten years following Furman, much of the Court's rhetoric in capital cases focused on its concerns as to the arbitrary application of the penalty. 48 In recent years, however, capital jurisprudence has moved away from concerns of consistency in favor of considerations of individuation.
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In order to allow for individualized moral determinations, there must exist both a voice for community values and a mechanism for channeling that input into criminal trials. The next section discusses the essential role of the jury as the conscience of the 
C. The Essential Role of the Jury
An evaluation of culpability is an essential part of a criminal trial. Though imperative that culpability be determined, it is less clear who must make the determination. We tend to think of the jury as the conscience of the community and the appropriate entity for determinations of criminal culpability. The other institutional actors in criminal proceedings lack the jury's ability to represent the community conscience. 50 This section begins by briefly evaluating each of these other institutional actors-legislators, prosecutors, and judges-as potential substitutes for the jury in making the requisite determination of condemnation in a criminal case. 51 Concluding that only the jury has the potential to translate community norms into legal consequence, this section explores the essential role of the jury in the criminal justice system.
As representative bodies whose election and retention depends upon their conformity with community sentiment, legislatures are arguably good barometers of the democratic will of the electorate and the moral conscience of the community. 52 As directly 50. Though this article looks at these actors independently, it can also be useful to view the capital system holistically with each institutional actor playing a role in determining the propriety of the judgment. Professors Richard A. Bierschbach 53 Upon examination, however, giving legislatures the responsibility to be the voice of community norms presents significant difficulties. For one thing, legislators, though elected, are likely to be influenced not just by community will but also by political pressure, special interests, and election posturing. 54 Another problem is that legislative enactments -are remarkably opaque,‖ and this inherent ambiguity of legislative actions makes it difficult to use legislative intent to discern any authoritative interpretation. 55 Even more than the pressures and opacity, however, it is the prospective nature of all legislative actions that make lawmakers particularly unsuited to the role of community conscience. While lawmakers can define offenses, or even abolish offenses or penalties, legislating is broad, and lawmaking lacks the individualization that is required in criminal trials. 56 The importance of individualized determinations in criminal proceedings is critical to provide a meaningful check on generalized support for a -tough on crime‖ approach. 57 infer popular sentiment).
53. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that public opinion polls should not be given weight unless -the elected representatives of a State's populace have not deemed them persuasive enough to prompt legislative action‖).
54. See, e.g., Bowers et al., supra note 52, at 619-20 (-Legislatures are a cauldron of political motivations and electoral concerns whose members play at least as large a role in creating and exploiting popular opinion as they do attempting to objectively assess it. The crass politicization of criminal justice issues over the last several decades has rendered the typical legislature ‗a dubious barometer' of public opinion . . . .‖); see also Criminal prosecutors play a significant role in charging and plea decisions. Structurally, the prosecutor is fashioned as counsel for the state, government, or community and is charged with the -exercise [of] professional judgment, as the ABA Criminal Justice Standard directs, ‗solely for the benefit of the client-the people-free of any compromising influences or loyalties. '‖ 58 For that reason, the prosecutor's ethical obligations compel focus not on victory but on seeing that justice is done. 59 Like legislatures, however, as an institutional actor, prosecutors fall short as a substitute for the jury. Prosecutors work closely with the police and often identify with the goal of conviction.
60 They may also labor under competing incentives; those with ambition to higher office may be motivated by the perception that a -tough on crime‖ stance will appeal to voters or that a high-profile conviction will be better for their career. 61 Even setting aside personal ambition or political pressures on the part of prosecutors, systemic pressures encourage prosecutorial overcharging in order to ensure extra room for plea negotiations, which can skew outcomes and lead to unjust results. 62 Thus, even in uncomplicated decisions, some studies have shown that a prosecutor may tend to act -according 59. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (-A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.‖); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.11 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (-A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.‖).
60. to idiosyncratic rules, norms, preferences, and biases.‖ 63 At least as currently structured under our adversarial system, prosecutors are just as likely to need to be kept in check as they are to effectively function as a neutral community conscience.
Neither is the judiciary likely to serve as an effective conscience of the community. Though -[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,‖ 64 ethical rules require that individual judicial determinations be driven by factors outside either the judge's personal feelings or community conscience. 65 Additionally, judges are often unelected and, at least for those in the federal system, enjoy lifetime appointments, attributes designed to insulate judges from the pressures of community sentiment. 66 These features are likely to have the effect of removing judges from reliably expressing community norms and values. 67 While the perception of judges as entirely neutral is but mythology, 68 their attempts at insulation and neutrality likely render them unreliable harbingers of community norms or values. Given the institutional options, most scholars and non-scholars agree that the jury is the primary entity best-suited to uphold the conscience of the community. 70 The jury's role as conscience of the community has deep roots. 71 Since the early history of the emerging republic, the jury has been viewed as a bulwark against governmental overreach and oppression. 72 Legislators of many early American states abandoned the common law tradition and vested juries with sentencing power. . . . Reformers also thought that juries were uniquely capable of assessing the proper punishment because, as members of the local community, they were more likely to be well-acquainted with the defendant's background and the particular circumstances of the offense. . . . As punishment options expanded beyond shaming sanctions and the mandatory death penalty and came to include various ranges and modes of imprisonment, there was more room for case-by-case decision making to which juries were thought to be well-suited.
Id.
72. There are volumes written on historical perceptions on the role of the jury. gling over the precise contours of the historical role of the American jury, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the criminal jury serves as a backstop against governmental action inconsistent with the community sensibility of moral norms. 73 As representatives of community norms and values, juries serve a number of functions. They promote public acceptance of both the judicial process and the resulting verdicts. 74 Juries also satisfy an important communicative function. 75 In the words of one scholar, juries are intended to serve not only as a check on out-of-touch legislatures and overzealous prosecutors, but also on the judiciary as well since - 145, 156 (1968) (-Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.‖).
77. Judge Learned Hand noted that The institution of trial by jury-especially in criminal cases-has its hold upon public favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual can forfeit his libertyto say nothing of his life-only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they came. Moreover, since if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove; and this introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions. A trial by any jury, however small, preserves both these fundamental elements and a trial by a judge preserves neither, at least to anything like the same degree. United States v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (discussing the jury as a barrier -to prevent oppression by the Government‖).
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A number of structural elements empower the jury in performing its role. 80 It is a foundational aspect of criminal law that absent a defendant's waiver, a jury must issue a verdict of conviction; regardless of how powerful the evidence, a judge may not direct a verdict against a criminal defendant. 81 This unique authority places the criminal jury in a position arguably superior to that of the trial court judge. In order to ensure that the jury is unfettered by any judicial attempt to require justification for its verdict, a judge may not submit special verdicts to a criminal jury. 82 In a jurisprudential concept imported from England, the jury cannot be sanctioned for its verdict, even if that verdict disregards the letter of the law. 83 The jury's not-guilty verdict is also protected from appeal by the prosecution. 84. Because judgments of conviction can be appealed while judgments of acquittal cannot, it has been said that juries have the last word on acquittal, but not on conviction. See AMAR, supra note 83, at 425. Professor Amar refers to this bias as one of the -prodefendant asymmetries‖ within our constitutional structure. bility. This critical role can be served only by the jury. By undertaking an evaluation of the blameworthiness of the defendant, juries bring social norms and values to bear on the otherwise insular process of determining criminal culpability. Though the concept of the essential role of the jury arises in death penalty proceedings, where it has long been held that -death is different,‖ the uniqueness of capital proceedings has been eroded as its jurisprudential concepts have been applied in other proceedings. The next section explores this expansion of death penalty jurisprudence.
II. DEATH IS NO LONGER UNIQUE-EXPANSION OF -DEATH IS DIFFERENT‖ JURISPRUDENCE
Enormous resources are spent on pursuit of the death penalty. Some of these resources reflect the heightened litigation standards and the reality that parties in capital cases push jurisprudential limits. 85 [C] apital punishment receives a disproportionate share of popular, political, and legal attention. The sheer number of films, books, magazine, and newspaper articles discussing and depicting capital cases would suggest that capital prosecutions, sentences, and executions are far more common than they actually are. On the political side, state legislatures devote considerable attention to prevailing capital procedures and proposed reforms, despite, in relative terms, the extraordinary infrequency of capital cases and the increasingly large share of state resources consumed by non-capital incarceration. . . . The complete absence of any federal policy addressing the states' unprecedented experiment with mass incarceration stands in notable contrast to Congress's attention to the ways in which federal review of capital cases can influence state capital policies.‖). But see Rachel E. Barkow 89 and DNA preservation 90 all began with capital cases. 91 The line between protections afforded in capital proceedings and those offered in non-capital proceedings is hard to hold and can tend toward erosion.
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Even in -death is different‖ jurisprudence, the line between capital and non-capital proceedings is more permeable than the rhetoric of -death is different‖ indicates. The Constitution does not expressly distinguish between capital and non-capital criminal proceedings, and when a procedure or protection is adopted as important or constitutionally mandated in the capital setting, it is difficult to deny that same protection to non-capital defendants. 93 At the very least, the withholding from non-capital defendants of protections made available in capital proceedings subjects courts to regular criticism and attempts to stretch and expand capital jurisprudence. 94 
. [T]he
Court's claim of difference must be analyzed to determine whether it is not merely factually true, but legally significant.‖); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 86, at 204 (-To recognize that ‗death is different' is also to assert that incarceration (as opposed to death) is different, too-less severe, less final, less problematic, and less worthy of attention. In light of our current crisis of mass incarceration, we need to be wary of any such implication.‖). 
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Despite some analytical incoherence, the divide between death penalty jurisprudence and non-capital criminal jurisprudence remained largely intact until 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, however, two broad jurisprudential trends eroded the partition between capital and non-capital offenses. The first trend has been described by one scholar as a radical expansion of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 96 The second shift is seen in the sharpening focus on the important role of the jury in criminal proceedings. 97 These trends can be viewed and analyzed in concert, as part of a more fundamental structural shift toward the incorporation of community norms and values into complex criminal determinations. 98 The next two sections will discuss these trends.
A. Expanding Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that -[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖ 99 Its simple language, however, belies complex underlying jurisprudence. Understanding the doctrine's expansion requires wading into some recognize the right for all, not just for those who might need the protection the most.‖).
95. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671, 687 (1984) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel necessarily includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588-89 (1935) (finding the exclusion of African Americans from the grand and petit jury pools unconstitutional in this -Scottsboro defendant‖ case); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 86, at 157 (-The death penalty, on this view, keeps criminal justice issues at the forefront of political and legal debate, and concerns about the fairness and reliability of the death penalty might trickle down to the much larger non-capital realm.‖).
96 Prior to 2010, application of the Eighth Amendment to noncapital criminal sentences reflected -a clear separation between capital and non-capital cases‖ and -restraint and deference to the states‖ in matters of proportionality. 100 In contrast to the standard applied in capital cases, Eighth Amendment review in non-capital cases essentially consisted of a narrow proportionality review.
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The non-capital review is limited and, according to the Court, the Eighth Amendment -does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,‖ instead -forbid[ing] only extreme sentences that are ‗grossly disproportionate' to the crime.‖ 102 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, under the parameters of the doctrine, -it has been difficult for the challenger to establish a lack of proportionality‖ in non-capital cases. 103 In capital cases, on the other hand, the Supreme Court looks to the -evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,‖ to determine whether a sentence of death is in line with contemporary values. 104 The standard used in capital cases of looking to community values is much more robust than the non-capital standard. been applied in non-capital arenas. The facts underlying the Graham v. Florida opinion involve a sixteen-year-old who received a sentence of life imprisonment for armed burglary and sought to invalidate that life sentence. 106 Rather than relying on the almost universally unsuccessful -narrow proportionality principles‖ applied to non-capital offenses, Graham asked the Court to apply the categorical analysis applicable to capital cases. 107 He claimed that his situation implicated the entire category of juvenile offenders sentenced to life sentences and merited, not a narrow proportionality review, but the -evolving standards of decency‖ review utilized in capital cases. 108 The majority of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, not only fully engaged the Eighth Amendment issue as framed by Graham, but also agreed with him and applied the broader categorical analysis to the juvenile's non-capital case. 109 The Court acknowledged that Graham's claim was not cognizable under the then-existing jurisprudence. 110 Missing from the majority opinion, however, was a discussion of the implications of the opinion on capital jurisprudence and, especially, on concepts of death's difference. 111 This omission from the majority opinion was not overlooked by the other Justices. Chief Justice Roberts noted that -[t]reating juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punishment is at odds with our longstanding view that ‗the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than 106 . Graham, 560 U.S. at 53-54, 57-58. Graham was sentenced originally to probation. Upon violating the terms of his probation, the trial court had discretion to impose a sentence of between five years and life. The probation report recommended a sentence below the statutory minimum, the defendant asked for five years, and the state argued for a thirty-year sentence on the charge. The trial court imposed a life sentence. 110. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (-The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two general classifications. The first involves challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case. The second comprises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.‖).
111. Id. at 88-89 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (pointing to the similarities between a sentence of life imprisonment and imposition of the death penalty). 116 Like in Graham, however, rather than apply just the narrow proportionality principles previously applicable to noncapital cases, the Court applied the -evolving standards of decency‖ jurisprudence previously reserved for capital cases as well as a narrow proportionality review. 117 Combining the two lines of jurisprudence, the Court ruled not that the juvenile sentences were per se unconstitutional, but rather that individualized determinations of the propriety of the sentences are mandated where a juvenile is given a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. he bright line the Court drew between two penalties has for many hears served as the principal justification for the Court's willingness to reject democratic choices regarding the death penalty. Today's decision eviscerated that distinction. ‗Death is different' no longer. . . . The Court's departure from the ‗death is different' distinction is especially mystifying when one considers how long it has resisted crossing that divide. Indeed, for a time the Court declined to apply proportionality principles to noncapital sentences at all, emphasizing that ‗a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long.'‖) (citations omitted In the short time since the decisions in Graham and Miller, scholars, courts, and practitioners have grappled with the implications of the clear expansion of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 119 Though the full implications of the cases have yet to be felt, discussion of the extent of the shift has been robust, with scholars and advocates analyzing the potential areas of impact. Scholars have surmised that the areas likely impacted range from the traditional Eighth Amendment area of prison conditions 120 to the entire area of juvenile law.
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121 Despite a lack of consensus as to the areas into which the new Eighth Amendment jurisprudence will expand, it is clear that the cap is off the bottle and the Eighth Amendment has grown significantly outside its prior confines.
122
Important to the doctrinal shift and notable for the analysis set forth in this article, the Court has indicated that community values, represented by the Eighth Amendment's evolving standards of decency jurisprudence, have a role to play even outside the capital arena.
The next section discusses a parallel jurisprudential shift, that of the expansion of the jury's role in criminal cases. The potential implications of these changes upon trials of protesters will be discussed later in the article.
B. The Sharpening Role of the Jury
The other area of great jurisprudential shift in the criminal arena since the turn of the millennium has been in the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision. 123 The right to a jury emerges from deep in our legal roots, with its constitutional foundation predating even the Sixth Amendment. 124 The extent of power that the Framers of the Constitution intended to rest with the jury is robustly debated.
125 Beyond significant dispute, however, is the importance of the jury's role as -guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny . . . .‖ 126 The importance of this function has been echoed by the Supreme Court in opinions calling the jury -fundamental to the American scheme of justice‖ and of -surpassing importance.‖
127
In practice, however, many commentators have noted the irony that the jury's rhetorical power was accompanied for many years by a constriction of its actual authority. 128 Prior to the Sixth Amendment's recent expansion, the jury's role in a non-capital case was rigidly confined to that of -fact-finder‖ during proceedings on guilt. 129 In the death penalty arena, the Court for years re-
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
124. Even before enactment of the Sixth Amendment, Article III of the Constitution embodied the requirement that -[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . . .‖ U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 57, at 34 (stating that the criminal jury was put into place by the Constitution to act as a check on the government well before Sixth Amendment guarantees were enacted).
125. , 1873) ); FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (-The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regarded it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.‖).
127. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1967 jected the argument that the Constitution required a jury to make the final decision imposing the death penalty on a defendant. 130 Instead, a judge, or panel of judges, could decide themselves the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors and even override the jury's decision that a life sentence was most appropriate. Until 2000, the Court's position on the Sixth Amendment was that, while it guaranteed the right to a jury trial at the conviction stage, -[t]he Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of [the appropriate punishment].‖
131
The harbinger of the Sixth Amendment revolution was a footnote, technically dicta, in a fairly ordinary carjacking case in which the judge found -serious bodily injury‖ and increased the defendant's sentence. 132 That case, Jones v. United States, upended business as usual in sentencing courts by raising the specter of a constitutional problem with judicial determination of sentencing facts.
133 A year later, significant upheaval began with Apprendi v. New Jersey's holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires that, except for prior convictions, -any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ 134 Summoning the historical role of the jury, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that the Sixth Amendment constitutionalized the core functions of eighteenth century juries. 135 Primary among those functions, according to the Court, was the jury's role as bulwark against governmental overreaching. 136 Importantly, Apprendi is more than a decision about jury sentencing. The case also prioritizes individual decision making in a manner analogous to that required in the capital arena. 137 Though the case at first appears to involve a tension between the judiciary and the jury, the true impact of Apprendi has been to shift the balance of authority for determinations of criminal sentencing from the legislature, via generalized pronouncements, to individualized conclusions by a jury. 138 Since Apprendi, sentence enhancements can be imposed only when accompanied by individualized jury determinations.
139 Jones, Apprendi, and the line of cases that followed signaled a victory for individualization over the structured, determinate sentencing that had previously been paramount. 140 Notably, the arguments on either side of the Apprendi debate mirror the tension seen in capital sentencing between individualized sentences and uniformity. 141. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-57, (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the practical aspects of the shift from general legislative determinations to individualized jury determinations, Justice Breyer notes that - [t] here are, to put it simply, far too many potentially relevant sentencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of them to a jury‖); see also Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 50, at 415.
As with the shift in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, discussion has been robust as scholars, courts, and practitioners grapple with the implications of the changing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Areas that some scholars have suggested will need to significantly change in order to accommodate the newfound power of the jury include restitution hearings, 142 parole violation proceedings, 143 and all criminal sentencing proceedings.
144
Death penalty jurisprudence, once an island unto itself, is evolving, and its reach is expanding as the partition between capital and non-capital offenses erodes. Though the jurisprudential shifts discussed above resonate in a number of legal contexts, the shifts are especially important for criminal trials of protesters, and it is to the topic of civil disobedience where the article turns next.
III. CIVILLY DISOBEDIENT PROTEST IS DIFFERENT
This section examines civilly disobedient protest, including its societal values and disruptive costs as well as the tension between these competing values when a civilly disobedient protester is charged with an offense. The first subsection summarizes the legal and social underpinnings of protest, focusing on the tension between protest and the rule of law and discussing the arguments both in favor of permitting robust civil disobedience and for limiting the role of protest. The second subsection explores the implications of these fundamental tensions, including how community norms and values play a role in determining the criminal culpability of civilly disobedient protesters. 146 Though a number of characteristics distinguish civil disobedience and non-protest criminal actions, perhaps no difference is more important than the motivation underlying the action. An act of civil disobedience is one -of conscience,‖ motivated by a desire to communicate a need for social or political change; it is this social benefit that is distinct from the motivation behind general criminal acts. 147 Though civil disobedience and law have coexisted for as long as the law has been around, their relationship is tense. 148 This ten-sion between speech and resistance on the one hand and the necessary law-abidingness of an orderly populace on the other has been challenging to navigate. Despite these concerns, civil disobedience in the United States enjoys a long history; one of the founding principles of the republic was the right of citizens to defy the laws of an oppressive political regime. 149 Though rule of law principles may be dominant in other countries, -Americans accept that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place in the political culture of their community.‖ 150 Though embodied in our social discourse, civil disobedience is not a recognized right in the U.S. Constitution. 151 Despite the absence of express constitutional protection, however, where protest is engaged in for an expressive purpose, the act is protected under the First Amendment. 152 The relationship between protest and the First Amendment has been described as one of complementary effects, with protest impacting the First Amendment, and the First Amendment impacting protest.
153
The need for a developed democratic system to tolerate some protest may be clear, but the question of whether civil disobedi- (1966) (-Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.‖). But see Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (rejecting the argument -that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please‖).
152. The First Amendment provides that -Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. ) (-The disciplined peacefulness of the civil rights activists and the underlying decency of their demands helped to create an atmosphere conducive to judicial liberality. The result was not only a beneficial transformation in the substantive law of race relations, but also a blossoming of libertarian themes in First Amendment jurisprudence. In the context of the First Amendment, as in many other areas, the struggle for racial justice produced ramifications that extended far beyond its point of origin. Once loosed, liberty, like equality, was an idea not easily cabined.‖).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:737 ence plays a positive role is another issue altogether. Some scholars argue that protest operates not merely as a counterbalance to democratic society and its limitations, but enhances democratic principles by correcting deficits that threaten the system. 154 Professor Daniel Markovits analogizes the role of civil disobedience to that of judicial review in that each, though fundamentally undemocratic, enforces fundamental rights and protects minorities within the majoritarian political system. 155 According to Markovits, even more than judicial review, civil disobedience is essential to offset democratic deficits by increasing citizen engagement and popular dialogue. 156 Civil disobedience increases democratic engagement by triggering reevaluation of issues that have been given inadequate attention.
157 Thus, Markovits sees civil disobedience as essential not just in societies with significant rights violations, but also in advanced democratic societies like the United States where -democratic disobedience [is] an unavoidable, even integral, part of a well-functioning democratic process.‖
158
Protest serves a variety of functions important to a healthy democracy. Protest operates as a mechanism to circumvent political and legal barriers to marginalized perspectives and to inject dissenting perspectives into the public dialogue. 159 In this way, it serves to allow issues that have been overlooked by the dominant discourse to find their way onto the public agenda. In addition, by providing a vehicle to raise dissenting opinions, civil disobedience operates as a -firebreak,‖ allowing marginalized political minorities to express their dissent before that unrest boils over in more 154. Markovits, supra note 147, at 1900. Markovits distinguishes between types of protest, separating those that enhance democratic dialogue about options from those that stifle it. Id. at 1939-44.
155. Id. at 1929 (-In the one case, self-appointed protesters disobey democratically enacted laws; in the other, unelected and unaccountable judges strike them down.‖). Markovits is not the only scholar to recognize that civil disobedience serves important values including free speech, protest, public debate, and the ability of citizens to challenge the government.
156 socially dangerous actions. 160 Further, an expression of conviction by a group of individuals can capture public attention, promote debate, increase democratic engagement, and contribute to the exchange of ideas. 161 That civil disobedience serves these socially beneficial functions is the reason a number of scholars consider actions of protest to be an affirmative virtue in an established democracy. 162 Not all of the impacts of civil disobedience are positive, however. Critics of civil disobedience point out that it exacts a social toll, the cost of which is felt especially upon order and the rule of law. 163 Perhaps most familiar to scholars, two former Supreme Court Justices have publicly affirmed the primacy of the rule of law over any benefits to be achieved by disobedience to criminal proscriptions enacted lawfully. 164 Justice Powell described the civ-UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:737 il disobedience of the 1960s as -heresy which could weaken the foundations of our system of government.‖ 165 His primary concerns rested with the potential for violence and civil unrest and the erosion of the rule of law. 166 Similarly, in 1968 Justice Fortas published a book on the role of civil disobedience in which he set forth his belief that -[e]ach of us owes a duty of obedience to law‖ as a -moral as well as a legal imperative.‖ 167 Granting any legal leniency or recognition to protesters would establish a jurisprudential paradigm that permits -legal illegality‖ and incentivize a practice that disrupts societal order. 168 In sum, civilly disobedient protest holds a complex place in the social and legal structures of the United States. The positive value of dissent and protest exists in deep tension with the rule of law and the social contract that demands obedience even in the face of individual disagreement. In trials of civilly disobedient protesters, these tensions are paramount. The next section explores the importance of a jury determination of culpability in light of the complex and competing values underlying protester trials.
B. The Role of the Community in Evaluating Civil Disobedience
The tensions between protest and obedience are particularly acute when a civilly disobedient protester is facing criminal prosecution. By definition, an act of civil disobedience is the intentional violation of a properly promulgated and presumptively valid law. 169 Equally inherent, however, is both that the motivation of the civilly disobedient protester is societal rather than personal gain and that the action itself, and the right to engage in the act, provide a public benefit. During proceedings in which a civilly tion of the community.‖ 173 Hart's position echoed that of sociologist Émile Durkheim, who believed that attaching blame for a crime performs the necessary social functions of allowing members of society to affirm the society's collective values, to express their disapproval of acts that offend these values, and to foster social cohesion. 174 In fact, blameworthiness is so critical that courts will infer the requirement even where a criminal statute does not expressly provide for it. 175 Though civil disobedience necessarily involves the violation of laws, society's response is not always to impose the same sanctions that would be imposed upon a non-civilly disobedient criminal defendant. The individual's motivation is one area of inquiry that is critical to a determination of the extent of an actor's blameworthiness, an area in which civilly disobedient protesters distinguish themselves from non-protester defendants. 176 Motivation is critical because, as studies have shown, judgments of blame vary depending on the reason for the action. We are more inclined to blame a transgressor with a bad motive than we are one with an altruistic motive.
177 Also important to determinations of blameworthiness are perceptions as to whether an individual has a good or bad character and the motivation underlying an action. 178 Accounting for this social science, civilly disobedient pro-testers are likely to be viewed as more or less blameworthy and criminally culpable depending how one views their underlying motivation, as well as the related implications of their action.
179
In addition, consideration of the place of protest may impact one's perspective as to the culpability of a protester. The recent example of civilly disobedient protester Tim DeChristopher-the subject of a feature length film, Bidder 70-is illustrative of a protester viewed as more culpable than a non-protesting defendant who committed the same action. 180 DeChristopher is an activist who in 2008 almost accidentally found himself inside a federal auction for oil and gas leases; he subsequently bid on and won nine auctioned oil and gas leases. 181 However, DeChristopher never intended to pay for the leases, which constituted a federal offense. 182 In sentencing him to a shockingly long two years imprisonment, the federal judge found support in both DeChristopher's lack of remorse and his public statements in support of civil disobedience. 183 The judge indicated that DeChristopher's statements in support of protest and civil disobedience, far more than his actions, justified his prosecution and the harsh sentence. 184 The federal appellate court affirmed the propriety of aggravating DeChristopher's sentence by relying on the same justification. When a civilly disobedient protester is criminally prosecuted, a balancing of competing values can happen at many stages and can lead to either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of the law as compared with non-protest related crimes. Underenforcement of criminal violations, on behalf of protesters or others, is neither uncommon nor inappropriate. 186 In all criminal cases, police and prosecutors use their discretion to decide whether to fully and vigorously enforce violations.
187 Conferring significant discretion on police and prosecutors recognizes that not all violations of law implicate the requisite culpability for criminal conviction.
188 Under-enforcement of criminal laws may reflect the recognition that -principles of democratic accountability sometimes require law enforcement to make room for public deviance.‖ 189 While police sometimes under-enforce against civilly disobedient protesters, police may also develop harsh strategies, including over-enforcement, to discourage or minimize the potential for protest. 190 Prosecutors may also use their discretionary power to overenforce. 191 Once made, these enforcement decisions are difficult to monitor, hidden from public view, and thus employed without significant accountability. Notably missing from the discretion in enforcing protest law violations, however, is a voice that articulates community values and norms. 193 In the death penalty arena, juries must undertake, individually in each case, to determine the moral culpability of the defendant and to balance the culpability with all of the other factors mitigating the sentence. 194 The foundational pillars underlying the requirement of a moral balancing were recently reaffirmed, strengthened, and expanded outside of the capital arena, as discussed previously. These pillars affirm the importance of the community voice as essential to weighing complex values. 195 Criminal prosecutions of civilly disobedient protesters, where the acts of political conscience are grounded in a desire for societal improvement, represent an area in which it may be especially appropriate to apply the recently endorsed expansive concepts of community input. The next section explores the implications of recognizing civilly disobedient protest as different and permitting jury involvement in determinations as to the culpability of protesters.
C. The Implications of Recognizing Protest as Different
In light of the expanding jurisprudence recognizing the role of the jury as community conscience, this article posits that society, represented by the jury, should be able to assess the criminal culpability of the civil disobedient protester. 196 This section addresses the nuts and bolts of what that evaluation would look like as well as some of the likely implications of implementing an explicit community determination of culpability into protester trials.
As with the weighing required in a capital case, an ultimate finding of moral culpability should underlie a determination of culpability in a protest case. Similar to the mechanisms employed in capital cases, juries should be permitted to consider an array of evidence that might tend to mitigate culpability when evaluating the conduct of civilly disobedient protesters. 197 In order to make a determination of blameworthiness, the jury would need to consider both the social costs and any social benefits of the action. Important to this consideration might be evidence as to the protester's goals, other unsuccessful legal attempts made by the protester establishing need for the action, the communicative value of the action, the social costs of the action, and the extent to which the costs could have been mitigated but were not. Ultimately, the jury would make a determination as to whether the social value of the action outweighs the costs such that the protester is insufficiently blameworthy to be held criminally liable.
198
If the jury finds that the protester's actions are insufficiently culpable and that the moral balance belongs on the side of the protester, the jury should be permitted to operate as a veto to a criminal conviction.
199
Implementation of this new evaluative framework would have a number of positive benefits. Perhaps chief among these would be an increase in democratic participation by society, with the jury as society's proxy. Not only does peaceful protest increase social dialogue, but the participation of the jury in the process of evaluating the value of the protest-as-speech also creates its own form of democratic speech. 200 The jury would be empowered to participate in a vigorous debate as to the important values and norms at issue in the trial. A related benefit would be to increase dialogue between protestors, the government, and the community. 201 protester was not culpable, the signal to the government would be that the community believed the issue important and the value of the action high. Such a verdict might indicate broad popular belief that the government action was worth protesting. Similarly, a verdict of conviction would indicate to protesters that the message or tactics were too socially costly or that they were not finding broad support. In addition, protesters planning actions would be incentivized to structure their action so as to appeal to the community and to promote public benefit. Since social cost will also be part of the ultimate evaluation, the test will nudge protesters to consider and reduce the social cost of their actions. Finally, given that the social balancing test would only be available to protesters who engage in the actions that meet a narrow definition of civil disobedience, the action would also encourage protesters toward non-violence in all actions.
Not all of the implications of the incorporation of communityfocused procedures would be positive. Indeed, proposing the adoption of a test from capital jurisprudence is in itself a red flag signaling the potential for procedural difficulties. 202 Trials in which the jury is permitted to consider the social costs and benefits of a protester action would look quite different from current proceedings; notably, the change would increase the length and complexity of these trials, burdening trial court, and reducing the efficiency of judicial administration. In light of current burdens on trial courts, this might be a significant cost. 203 In addition, some commentators will have concerns that juries are unprepared for such a complex balancing of emotionally charged material and that we should discourage verdicts based on moral determinations rather than strict legal standards. 204 Another critique might be that legal
CONCLUSION
Capital jurisprudence is no longer a silo. The recent expansion of two foundational jurisprudential pillars underlying death penalty procedures affirm the role of the jury and the importance of a community voice in moral determinations of culpability. Though the interests that compete in the capital arena are unique, the values underlying acts of civil disobedience are similar in depth and complexity to the values underlying the individualization and community conscience requirements in capital proceedings. The principles and procedures employed in the capital arena thus offer important guidance for criminal prosecutions involving civilly disobedient protesters. Within the vortex of competing values that exist when a civilly disobedient protester is criminally prosecuted for an act of protest, the voice of the community has a critical and irreplaceable role, and only the jury can adequately give voice to community norms and values. Thus, in criminal prosecutions of protesters, society, represented by the jury, should evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the individual action offends collective values sufficiently to warrant the community condemnation implicit in a criminal conviction.
